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Abstract
We build a model in which veriﬁability of private debts, timing mismatch in debt settlements
and borrowing leverage lead to liquidity crisis in the ﬁnancial market. Central bank can respond
to the liquidity crisis by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that resembles repurchase
agreements between the central bank and the lenders. This policy is eﬀective if the timing
mismatch is nominal (i.e., a settlement participation risk). It is ineﬀective if the timing mismatch
is driven by a real shock (i.e., preference shock).
Keywords: liquidity problem, timing mismatch, leveraging, liquidity shock, settlement risk,
repurchase agreement, consumption shock
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Financial crises are rare events in the United States. Yet, in those rare events, liquidity problems
attract a great deal of attention. Indeed, at the onset of the 2007 Financial Crisis, the Federal
Reserve adopted radical new facilities in order to address the liquidity problems. From January
2008 to January 2010, the Fed’s monetary liabilities increased from $800 billion to $2 trillion.
Despite a large supply of treasury securities available, the Fed began directly purchasing private
credit market instruments.1 Why did the Federal Reserve resort to directly buying private credit
∗Gu: University of Missouri; Haslag: University of Missouri. We wish to thank Valerie Bencivenga, Pedro Gomis,
Ed Nosal, Daniel Sanches, Chris Waller, participants at the the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Monetary Workshop
and seminar participants at the University of Missouri. All remaining errors are our responsibility.
1Schreft and Smith (2002) analyzed the conduct of monetary policy in a setting in which the quantity of government
debt was small and shrinking. Private securities may have to be used in open market operations when no treasury
debt is outstanding.
1instruments in order to expand liquidity? More importantly, under what conditions are these new
facilities welfare improving?
To study these questions, we build a model in a three-period overlapping generations setup in
which the two basic elements—ﬁat money and private debts—coexist. Fiat money is valued because
it facilitates intergenerational transactions. Within a generation, some agents are endowed with
capital (they will become lenders in our model) and the others have access to short-term and long-
term production technologies (these are the borrowers). Borrowers issue debts to acquire capital
to produce. Debt contracts, or IOUs, can be settled either one period (short-term) or two periods
(long-term) after issue. Long-term IOUs bear higher interest as the return to long-term production
is higher. IOUs can be settled by two types of assets—consumption good, which is produced by
the production technologies and is valued by the lenders, and ﬁat money, which can be used to
purchase the consumption good.2
To be clear, we do not attempt to explicitly model the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis. Instead, we
build an environment with typical frictions in the ﬁnancial market in which unconventional mon-
etary policy can play a role. In our approach, three typical frictions—veriﬁability of private debts,
timing mismatches in private debt settlement and leverage—are essential to a liquidity problem.
Private debt contracts are not veriﬁable everywhere, and cannot circulate as a means of payments
for consumption goods even in absence of default risk. Therefore, private debt has to be redeemed
at the settlement time. However, the settlement between lenders and borrowers is subject to timing
mismatch. Lenders face uncertainty in whether they can participate in long-term debt settlements.
If they cannot, they sell long-term debts in a secondary market at a price determined by the
available liquidity.
The veriﬁability problem and timing mismatch provide trading opportunities in the secondary
market. But it is the leverage that drives the liquidity shortage in the secondary market, and thus
the liquidity problem.3 In the short term, borrower’s available liquidity is accumulated ﬁat money
2The settlement process described here is essentially the same as that put forward in Freeman (1996). We modify
it so that units of the consumption good are also acceptable as a settlement device. We can say that private debt in
this model economy is consistent with the real bills doctrine.
3Lippman and McCall (1986) provide an excellent overview of the concept of liquidity. Throughout our analysis,
we adopt the notion put forward by Hirshleifer (1968), who argued that liquidity is "an asset’s capability over time
of being realized in the form of funds available for immediate consumption or reinvestment—proximately in the form
of money" (p.1). Outside money can be used generally to obtain consumption goods because it is veriﬁable while
inside money is more limited because it is not veriﬁable.
2balances. If long-term borrowers are able to accumulate suﬃcient money balances to settle debts
before their investment matures, debts will be settled at par. Otherwise, debts will be sold at a
discount price. That is, the liquidity problem arises only if long-term borrowers borrow more than
what they can settle with money in the short term, or in other words, only if they are leveraged
when they borrow.4
The liquidity problem causes misallocation of consumption and production. The lenders who
are excluded from long-term debt settlements see their consumption decline relative to those who
are not subject to the participation retrictrion. The reason is simple, restricted lenders sell their
IOUs at a discount. When debt sells at a discount price, there is an opportunity to make proﬁti n
the seondary market, inducing some borrowers to choose the lower return, short-term technology.
The central bank can address the liquidity problem using a three-step policy that is observa-
tionally equivalent to a repurchase agreement. The central bank purchases private debt contracts
at par in the secondary market using money, holds the IOUs for one period and then settles with
the issuers. Finally, the bank accepts ﬁat money in the consumption good market by selling the
goods that are received from settlement, taking the money out of circulation. We refer to this policy
as an unconventional repurchase agreement. Unconventional in the sense that the central bank is
purchasing a private credit instrument in the open market.5 Because of the overlapping generations
structure of our model, the central bank operates purchase and repurchase simultaneously (but to
diﬀerent generations) in a period, and the aggregate money stock is constant over time. Hence,
the unconventional policy redistributes liquidity to diﬀerent markets. The liquidity injected in the
secondary market raises the price of debt to par and eliminates proﬁts in the secondary market.
Thus, all capital is invested in the higher return, long-term production and eﬃciency is achieved.
The central bank is able to solve the liquidity problem because it has two advantages over
individual agents. First, it can costlessly produce ﬁat money and replace the unveriﬁable private
debts with veriﬁable ﬁat money. Second, the bank is not subject to the settlement participation
restrictions. So the bank literally holds the private IOUs for the lenders and returns the matured
IOUs to the lenders after one period. We consider these two advantages to be the basic elements
of the functions that deﬁne a central bank. In an economy with typical ﬁnancial frictions present,
4See Holmstrom and Tirole (2011) for a description of the interaction between liquidity and leveraging.
5Hence, the liquidity problem is solved by a modiﬁed version of Gertler and Karadi’s (2011) unconventional
monetary policy.
3unconventional monetary policy is useful simply due to the central bank’s fundamental functions.
The literature discusses unconventional monetary policy from an agency diﬀerent perspective.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) investigate unconventional monetary policy in a model in which principal-
agent problems exist between the lenders and borrowers, but not between the central bank and
lenders. The central bank can act like an intermediary during a ﬁnancial crisis, eliminating the
principal-agent problem and stimulating output. From a mechanism design standpoint, the question
is whether the commercial banks would be sustainable in the long run or whether the central bank
would emerge as the sole ﬁnancial intermediary.6
We extend the baseline model economy in two ways. First, we consider a case in which there
are generation-speciﬁc goods. As opposed to a single consumption good, there is a good that is
preferred by each generation. We demonstrate that this modiﬁcation has no eﬀect on the optimal
unconventional monetary policy. Second, we modify the lender’s preference. Instead of having
a settlement participation risk, the lenders are subject to preference shocks. Some lenders have
to settle before long-term production completes because they only value middle-aged, or early,
consumption. With such a change to preferences, the secondary market price is eﬃcient even
though the price is below the par in some cases. Here the discount price measures the relative cost
of consumption. Early consumption is more costly as it requires some resources to be allocated in the
lower return, short-term technology. Because the laissez-faire price is eﬃcient, policy intervention
is unnecessary and can be harmful. A lesson we learn from this exercise is that when the secondary
market price falls below par, it does does not necessarily justify policy intervention. Identifying
the driving force behind the discount price—whether it is due to a pure settlement restriction or a
preference shock—is important.
In a closely related paper, Williamson (2011) studies a broad range of monetary and ﬁscal policy
actions in a New Monetarist model economy. In presence of a real shock to production, the central
bank’s lending to producers is redundant, unless it oﬀers better terms to producers than they would
receive in the private sector, in which case central bank’s lending only has redistributional eﬀect.
Our result conﬁrms Williamson’s view on unconventional monetary policy; it is ineﬀective if the
underlying shock is a real one.
6There is extensive literature studying principal-agent problem that results in ﬁnancial crisis and ampliﬁes shocks
at business cycles frequencies. See Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). See also Hall (2011) for and excellent, brief overview
of the literature on principal-agent problems and economic activity.
4The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the physical environment. Section 3
solves for the equilibrium in the baseline model. Section 4 solves the planner’s allocation. Section
5 describes the repurchase agreement that implements the planner’s allocation. Sections 6 and 7
discuss two extensions to the baseline model. Section 8 concludes.
2 Environment
There is an inﬁnite sequence of time periods. Dates are indexed by  =1 23.T h e r ea r e t w o
types of agents: type 1 and type 2. Each period, a continuum of measure one of each type are
born. Both types of agents live for three periods. At date  =1 , there is the initial old generation
that lives for one period and the initial middle-agedg e n e r a t i o nt h a tl i v e sf o rt w op e r i o d s .F o rb o t h
the intial-old generation and the initial middle-aged generation, there is a continuum of measure
one of each type.
The commodity space consists of single, perishable consumption goods and physical capital.
Each type 1 is endowed with  units of the capital good when young and nothing middle-aged or
old. Meanwhile, each type 2 agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young. We assume
that at each date labor is transformed into units of the consumption good at a one-for-one rate.
In addition, young type 2 agents have access to two production technologies that turn capital into
future units of the consumption good. The short-term technology and long-term technology are
represented by production functions  () and  (), respectively. We assume that 1 and
that  () is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. For any date-
investment, the short-term technology yields output at date  +1 , whereas long-term technology
yields output at date +2. Without loss of generality, we assume that the a type 2 agent is engaged
in either the short-term or the long-term technology. Let  be the measure of type 2 agents who
choose the short-term technology (we refer to these type 2 agents as short-term producers) and 1−
be the measure of type 2 who choose the long-term technology (we call them long-term producers).
Capital depreciates fully after production completes. The initial old and initial middle-aged type
1 agents own a ﬁxed stock of ﬁat money, totaling 0 dollars. The initial old and the initial
middle-aged type 2 agents are endowed with consumption good.
Type 1 agents value the consumption good when they are middle-aged and old. Let (2+1 + 3+2)
5denote a type 1’s preference, where  is type 1’s consumption. In general, when there are two sub-
scripts, the ﬁrst denotes period of life and the second denotes the date. Type 2 agents value
consumption when old and derive disutility from working when young. Let −(1)+(3+2)
represent a type 2’s preference, where  is the labor used when young and  is the consumption
when old. We assume that (·) and (·) are strictly increasing, strictly concave and diﬀerentiable,




At each date, settlement and markets open sequentially. In order, the capital market trades,
settlement meetings occur, private IOUs trade in the secondary market, and the consumption
good market trades. Type 2 agents participate in all exchanges during their life. A type 1 agent
participates in all exchange during his life with probability  and with probability 1 −  he is
excluded from settlement when old. Type 1 agents learn their market participation pattern when
middle-aged. By law of large numbers, a fraction of 1− type 1 agents are excluded from settlement
when old.
In the capital market, young type 2 agents acquire capital from young type 1 agents. The
young type 2 agents then decide to employ the capital in either the short-term or the long-term
technology. Because young type 2 agents have neither money nor consumption goods, they issue
private debt contracts to the young type 1 agents in exchange for the capital. Accordingly, we refer
to type 1 agents as lenders and type 2 agents as borrowers. The debt contracts charge diﬀerent
interest rates depending on when the IOUs are settled. Without loss of generality, we assume the
nominal interest rate on IOU is 1 for those settled when borrowers are middle-aged. If settled
when old, the borrower pays the nominal (gross) interest rate 1+. IOUs can be settled by either
ﬁat money or the consumption good. During settlement, debt contracts are costlessly enforced;
that is, there is no default risk. However, private IOUs are not veriﬁable in the consumption good
market. Because of the veriﬁability concern, debt contracts cannot be used in future transactions
as a means of payment.
The temporal mismatch becomes evident at settlement. Note that both middle-aged and old
borrowers are present at settlement, but some old lenders are excluded. For borrowers choosing
the short-term technology, they settle IOUs when middle-aged. For long-term producers, they may
not be able to settle when middle-aged. Long-term producers can use their accumulated money
6balances to settle some of IOUs. Middle-aged lenders can sell unsettled IOUs in the secondary
market. We call the lenders who sell (buy) IOUs in the secondary market when middle-aged as
early-settling (late-settling) lenders. Denote the measure of early-settling lenders by 1 − ˜  with
max{˜ } = . That is, the lenders who are excluded from settlement when old have to sell unsettled
IOUs in the secondary market. Producers who have settled all their debt contracts can buy IOUs
in the secondary market.
Lastly, the consumption goods market opens. The sellers are young borrowers who produce
consumption goods using labor. The buyers are the middle-aged and the old borrowers and lenders.
In consumption good market, buyers trade ﬁat money for consumption good. This explains how
borrowers have ﬁat money in debt settlement. Note that borrowers cannot participate in the
secondary market or goods market before they settle all IOUs.
3 The baseline model
3.1 Lenders
The lender’s problem is straightforward to solve and thus where we start. With the lender’s
preferences, capital is inelastically lent to the borrowers. Because we assume the technology decision
is private information, the lender sells the capital to short-term and long-term producers at the
same price. The nominal value of the debt contract is ,w h e r e is the price of capital at time
. For early-settling lenders, unsettled IOUs are sold in the secondary market when middle-aged.
The early-settling lender then buys consumption goods from the young borrowers in the goods
market. Therefore, the early-settling lenders date- budget constraint is
£
+1 (1 + )(1− )+
¤
 =m i n{+1 +2}(2+1 + 3+2) (1)
where  is the price of consumption goods at time ,  is the net interest rate on the IOUs issued
at  and settled at +2,  is the fraction of the debt contracts that are settled when middle-aged,
and +1 is the price of IOUs in the secondary market at time +1.T h ev a l u eo f is determined by
the borrower’s production choice, which will be clear at the end of the section. The early-settling
lenders have the choice of consuming when middle-aged or old, depending on the period in which
goods are cheaper.
7A late-settling lender purchases IOUs in the secondary market, receiving settlement next period.
A late-settling lender uses money and goods obtained from settled IOUs, i.e., , to purchase
unsettled debt contracts. A late-settling lender’s budget constraint is




In what follows, we use superscript “∗” to denote the variables associated with late-settling lenders
and long-term producers.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the interest rate satisﬁes +1 (1 + )=1 ,a n d+1 =  =1if  =1 .
By Lemma 1, the lender’s consumption is determined by the budget constraints. Formally,












Note that early-settling lenders’ total income is equal to the nominal value of the debt, whereas
late-settling lenders earn extra interest of  on the IOUs minus the inﬂation rate.
3.2 Short-term producers
When young, a short-term producer borrows from young lenders and uses labor to produce for the
middle-aged and the old agents. Let  be the nominal value of IOUs that the short-term producer
issues at date . Capital purchases are linked to the size of the debt by the following expression
 =  (5)
With his labor, the young borrower produces consumption good, trading it for ﬁat money. At
the end of date , the short-term producer’s money balances, denoted by ,a r e
 = 1 (6)
When middle-aged, the short-term producer completes production. After debt settlement, the
short-term producer has nominal resources worth +1()+ − , which he uses to purchase
8IOUs in the secondary market.7 When these IOUs are ﬁnally settled in the next period, the short-
term producer gets (1 + )[+1()+ − ],w h i c hﬁnances his old-age consumption. From




Plug (5) − (6) to (7) to get the short-term producer’s life-time budget constraint:
+1()+1 −  = +1+23+2 (8)










A long-term producers solves a similar problem as a short-term producer. Let ∗
 and ∗
 be the
nominal value of the IOUs and money balances that a young long-term producer has. When middle
aged, the long-term producer settles some, if not all, IOUs with money. If money is suﬃcient to
cover the debt, i.e., ∗
 ≥ ∗
, the long-term producer can apply any remaining liquidity to purchase
IOUs in the secondary market with gross return of 1+1.8 In contrast, with ∗
  ∗
 the long-term
producer must redeem remaining indebtedness when old, paying 1+ after long-term production
is complete. Long-term producers ﬁnance their old-age consumption using after-debt income. By













 to get the long-term producer’s lifetime budget constraint as
7Note that the short-term producers do not have to participate in the secondary market. Instead, they can partic-
ipate in the goods markets and arbitrage between diﬀerent time periods if prices are not stationary. In equilibrium,
the short-term producers must be indiﬀerent to these two options. Here we assume they participate in the secondary
market only, as later we will focus on the stationary equilibrium where arbitraging between time periods result in
zero proﬁt.
8Note that the long-term producers can choose not to participate in the secondary market. See footnote 6. Here we























A borrower chooses production technology by comparing the lifetime utility of being a short-term
or a long-term producer. If the two technologies yield the same utility, he chooses the short-term
technology with probability . By law of large numbers, the fraction of short-term producers is
. Given the fraction of short-term producers, the fraction of debts that are settled when the













The competitive market clearing conditions are
 =  +( 1− )∗

 +( 1− )∗





= −23 +( 1− −2)∗
3 +˜ −2∗
3
+(1− ˜ −2)3 +( 1− ˜ −1)2
The ﬁrst equation is the market clearing condition for capital. The second equation represents the
market-clearing condition for the consumption good. Consumption goods are supplied by young
borrowers, middle-aged short-term producers and old-aged long-term producers. Old borrowers,
old lenders, and middle-aged early-settling lenders demand consumption goods.
The money market-clearing condition is
0 =  +( 1− )∗

The loan market-clearing condition is
 =  +( 1− )∗

10With Lemma 1 and the ﬁrst-order conditions from the producer’s problem, the secondary
market-clearing condition can be written as
−1 [(−1)+1−1]+( 1− −1)∗





The left-hand side is the supply of liquidity in real terms. It comes from two sources—short-term
producer’s output and the borrowers’ money balances. Recall that borrowers obtain money when
they are young by selling labor-produced consumption good. The RHS is the demand for liquidity.
It is the early-settling lender’s unsettled IOUs. If settled when lenders are old, the face value of




, which is the capital income of the long-term production. If
the supply of liquidity is abundant, these IOUs will sell at par value; that is,  =1 .O t h e r w i s e ,
IOUs are discounted and  is the market-clearing price. Thus, (15) holds with equality if and only
if   1.
A competitive rational expectations equilibrium is deﬁned as (i) borrowers and lenders maximize
expected lifetime utility, taking prices as given; (ii) all markets clear; and (iii) the subjective distri-
butions of production types and settling types are equal to the objective distribution of production
types and settling types.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium fraction of long-term producers is strictly positive, or 1 −   0.
If   0, both short-term producers and long-term producers choose  = ∗
 = .
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Borrowers choose short-term technology because
short-term output can be used to purchase unsettled IOUs in the secondary market. However,
if all borrowers chose short-term technology, all IOUs would be paid when middle-age. In the
secondary market, IOUs would be priced at par and there would be no proﬁt. Thus, the returns
from the long-term technology will dominate and some positive measure of borrowers will opt for
the long-term technology.
In what follows, we focus on stationary equilibrium. With consumption good prices being the
same across time, lenders will participate in the secondary market if they can. That is, ˜  = .
Because (·) is strictly concave and (·) is strictly convex, the equilibrium is unique. Depending
on the borrower’s resources, we demonstrate that one of three possible equilibrium outcome will be











() − 0 ()
¤
∗
3 = 0 () ∗
2 =0
2 + 3 = 0 ()
and 1 = ∗
1, 3 = ∗
3,  = ∗ = .
The three cases identify three mutually exclusive partitions according to the fraction of short-
term producers and the price of IOUs in the secondary market.
Case 1:  =0 ,  =1 ,a n d∗
1 ≥ (1 − )0 ().
Case 2:  =0 ,  =
∗
1
(1−)0(),a n d(1 − )0 () ≤ ∗
1  (1 − )0 ().
Case 3:  =
(1−)0()−∗
1




1  (1 − )0 ().
First, note that the debt settlement is endogenized in equilibrium. It is determined together with
the discount price in the secondary market. Long-term producers produce ∗
1 units of consumption
goods when young in exchange for money. When money is ample in the secondary market as in
case 1, all short-term IOUs are settled at par. Since there is no proﬁt in the secondary market,
all borrowers choose long-term technology. Early-settling lenders receive (1 − )0 (),w h i c hi s
the capital income of long-term production. If money is scarce as in cases 2 and 3, short-term debts
have to be discounted. If discount is mild, proﬁt in the secondary market is not suﬃcient to induce
short-term production (case 2). But if discount is big (case 3), some borrowers will choose short-
term production. Because goods can settle debt contracts, the short-term technology output adds
liquidity to the secondary market. In equilibrium, borrowers are indiﬀerent to which technology to
choose, because the return on the short-term production plus the proﬁt in the secondary market
equals the returns on the long-term production. Long-term production scales up the return to
short-term production by , the discount price is 1, which is the lower bound on the discount
price identiﬁed by case 3.
In cases 2 and 3, long-term producers have issued IOUs that exceed the value of their money
holdings. Thus, both cases are marked by leveraging. Operationally, leveraging means that veriﬁ-
able money is scarce and cannot be used to settle all IOUs in the short run. The liquidity problem
arises when money is valued at a premium relative to the IOUs.
12Timing mismatch, veriﬁability and leveraging are the three key ingredients that drive the liq-
uidity problem in our model. Timing mismatch and the unveriﬁability of private debt contracts in
the goods market create the secondary market for the resale of IOUs. However, timing mismatch
and veriﬁability are not suﬃcient to generate liquidity problem (note that liquidity problem does
not present in case 1). Borrowers have suﬃcient resources to avoid default. However, borrowers
that are leveraged do not have resources available for the early-settling lenders as needed. In these
scenarios, liquidity problem presents.
Our results provide a formal link between leveraging and liquidity problems in a general equi-
librium setting. The recent literature on leveraging and liquidity has focused on principal-agent
problems. For example, in Acharya and Viswanathan (2011), the borrower chooses the riskiness
of the assets acquired with borrowed resources unbeknownst to the lender. Higher returns are
associated with the higher risk assets. Such leveraging explains why negative shocks to asset values
are associated with market liquidity problems. The negative shock to asset values means that the
borrower is unable to repay their lenders or to rollover their debts.9 In our setting, no hidden action
problems exist between lenders and borrowers. The problem is not default risk, but settlement risk.
Leveraging is present because borrowers can choose a technology that permits them to borrow more
than the value of their middle-aged assets. This is not to say that principal-agent problems are not
important. Rather, our view is that principal-agent problems are not necessary for leveraging to
occur and therefore not necessary for leveraging to amplify liquidity problems into a crisis.
To further illustrate the three cases, consider a numeric example in which the measure of early-
settling lenders is varied.









1− , respectively, where  =1 5 and  =4 . The production function
is an intensive form of the Cobb-Douglas, where  ()=13. The rest of the parameters are  =1
and  =1 5.W ev a r y between 0 and 1 and plot  and  as  changes (see Figure 1). In this
exercise, case 1 occurs when 062 ≤ 1,c a s e2o c c u r sw h e n032 ≤  ≤ 062, and case 3 occurs
when 0 ≤ 032.
Figure 1
9See also, Adrian and Shin (2010). They identify leveraging by examining assets that are marked to market. They
























The numerical example illustrates the impact that diﬀerent size liquidity shocks play in deter-
mining which equilibrium is realized. With  =1 , for example, there is no liquidity shock because
all lenders can participate in all markets. However, as  declines (i.e., the measure of early-settling
lenders increases), the economy moves from equilibrium case 1, to case 2, and eventually case 3.
That is, when the liquidity shock is large enough—a liquidity crisis can occur conditioned on the
timing mismatch and leveraging. And the crisis is more serious when the liquidity shock is larger.
4 Planner’s allocation
In the previous section, we identify the liquidity problem, leaving us to speculate on whether there
exists a policy intervention that can improve welfare. Before we proceed to policy discussion, we
ﬁrst formulate a planner’s allocation that characterizes the eﬃcient stationary allocations. Each
generation is given the same weight in the planner’s objective function, though within each gener-
ation, the weights applied to lenders and borrowers are generalized. The planner faces no market
frictions. Accordingly, the solution is the ﬁrst-best allocation.
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 [1 +  ()] + (1 − )[∗
1 +  (∗)] = (1 − )(2 + 3)+(∗
2 + ∗
3)+3 +( 1− )∗
3 (17)
 =  +( 1− )∗ (18)
0 ≤  ≤ 1 (19)
where  is the weight given to borrower’s lifetime in the planner’s welfare function. The ﬁrst two
constraints are the resource constraints for consumption good and capital good, respectively. The
third constraint indicates that the fraction of short-term producers cannot lie outside the unit
interval.
Let the “hat” on the variables denote the values that satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions for
the planner’s problem. After simplifying, planner’s allocation is characterized by the following
equations:
ˆ  =0 (20)
ˆ ∗ =  (21)


















0 (ˆ 2 +ˆ 3) (24)
Note that the planner’s allocation is not unique because lenders treat middle-age and old-age
consumption as perfect substitutes. Without loss of generality, we assume ˆ 2 =ˆ ∗
2 =0 .T h a t i s ,
young borrowers only produce for the old. Because long-term technology dominates the short-term
technology, the planner allocates the economy’s entire capital endowment to long-term production.
The planner’s allocation provides full risk sharing to lenders.
By comparing the ﬁrst-order conditions in the planner’s allocation and three cases characterizing
equilibrium in the decentralized economy, we ﬁnd the planner’s allocation is implemented in the
decentralized economy in Case 1, but not in Cases 2 or 3.
15Proposition 2 The stationary equilibrium in the decentralized economy achieves the planner’s
allocation for some welfare weight  if and only if the equilibrium is in case 1.
5 Repurchase agreements and transfers
Suppose there is a central bank that operates in debt settlement and the secondary market. How
would the central bank solve the liquidity problem in cases 2 and 3 of the decentralized economy
so that the planner’s allocation is implemented? Consider a three-step mechanism. First, the
central bank conducts an open market purchase in the secondary market, oﬀering ˜  units of ﬁat
money in exchange for private debt contracts at a discount price . In the next period, IOUs are
settled by long-term producers, oﬀering goods as payment. The central bank then sells the goods
to old agents such that the nominal value of the goods is equal to ˜  units of ﬁat money. Due to
the overlapping generations structure of the model, the money injected to the secondary market
(to purchase IOUs issued by generation ) is removed from the economy by the money taken out
from the goods market (for the goods consumed by generation  − 1) in the same period. The
transactions between the central bank and lenders are a repurchase agreement—the central bank
purchases private IOUs from the middle-aged early-settling lenders using money and repurchases
money using consumption goods in the next period. Of course, ˜  and  need to be set to clear the
resale market.
In addition to the repurchase agreement, the central bank operates a lump-sum tax and transfer
process. Let  ∗ and ∗ denote the net life-time tax on the short-term producers, long-
term producers, early-settling lenders, and late-settling lenders, respectively. The only restriction
is that young lender’s capital is not taxable.10 The central bank runs a balanced budget in each
period. The following proposition is derived with these policy tools.
Proposition 3 The optimal price of IOUs in the secondary market is par, which implements plan-
ner’s allocation in the decentralized economy.
Proof. Let  =1 ,   ∗,a n d = ∗. The central bank commits to buy unlimited amount
of private IOUs at the price of  =1(although in equilibrium only a ﬁnite amount of money is
10This assumption is to make sure that markets do not disappear with the tax scheme. The central bank cannot
simply force lenders to give up all capital when young and compensate them with consumption goods when middle-
aged and old.
16injected). Because this policy action renders zero proﬁts in the secondary market and because
long-term producers are taxed less, there are only long-term producers in equilibrium. With  =1 ,
the borrower’s ﬁrst-order condition is identical to the ﬁrst-order condition in the planner’s problem
and the lender’s consumption is the same regardless whether they are permitted to meet in the
settlement and secondary markets once or twice. As the central bank commits to provide unlimited
liquidity, the liquidity supply in the secondary market is suﬃcient and (15) is irrelevant for the
equilibrium. Lastly, the value of ∗ and ∗ are chosen in such a way that the marginal utility for




=( 1− )0 () − ˆ ∗
1.
Policies can implement the planner’s allocation because lenders are indiﬀerent between consum-
ing when middle-aged or old-aged. In other words, lenders treat short-term output and long-term
output as perfect substitutes. The timing mismatch is resolved by permitting the central bank to
serve as holder of private IOUs. When the goods are available, the holder applies these consump-
tion goods to redeeming IOUs held by early-settling lenders. Consequently, the optimal allocation
is to invest all capital to higher-return, long-term production. Because the IOUs are sold at par
under the central bank policy, the proﬁt in the secondary market is zero. All borrowers choose
the long-term production. The ineﬃciency present in the decentralized economy is purely a liquid-
ity problem. The central bank overcomes production ineﬃciency by replacing a cheaply provided
good—money—instead of using a costly one—short-term production.
Note that our repurchase agreement is a modiﬁed version of the unconventional monetary policy
put forward in Gertler and Karadi (2011). In our setup, the central bank directly purchases private
credit instruments. In their paper, Gertler and Karadi demonstrate how unconventional monetary
policy can moderate the amplitude of a cyclical ﬂuctuation by injecting liquidity. Here, we show
three things related to unconventional monetary policy. First, stationary output levels are greater
when the unconventional monetary policy is implemented compared with when there is no active
monetary policy. Second, one-period and two-period returns are equalized for lenders; in other
words, the yield curve ﬂattens. Third, the unconventional monetary policy deals with distribution
of liquidity not the aggregate quantity of liquidity.
In addition, unconventional monetary policy oﬀers a diﬀerent perspective on leveraging and
liquidity. The existing literature has focused the principal-agent characteristics that induce lever-
17aging, thereby ignoring solutions to the liquidity problems that arise. In particular, the literature
does not address whether an agent or institution exists capable of choosing policies that implement
the eﬃcient allocation. Our setup treats the central bank as a third-party institution controlling
the amount and the distribution of liquidity. When facing a liquidity problem, the central bank
responds by creating liquidity based on the value of the underlying asset. Since there is no default
risk, the central bank purchases private IOUs at par. When it matures, IOUs are settled and
liquidity is extracted. In this way, any transfers are undone.
6 An economy with generation-speciﬁc consumption goods
We modify the model to consider an economy in which the commodity space consists of generation-
speciﬁc consumption goods and physical capital. Capital endowed with generation  produces goods
that are valued only by their own generation. The reason why we introduce generation-speciﬁc
g o o d si st h a tb o r r o w e r sm a yh a v es p e c i ﬁc use of the loan. The output from the loan may only
be valued by a particular pair of lender-borrower. Here, we assume borrowers and lenders in each
generation is a particular pair. Meanwhile, we want to keep the use of money to be universal. So we
assume that labor is a general input. That is, young borrowers can produce any generation-speciﬁc
goods for the middle-aged and old agents.
The planner’s objective function is the same as in (16). The resources constraint for consumption
good is changed. Because in every period there are two generation-speciﬁc goods, the planner
decides how much of each generation-speciﬁc good needs to be allocated. Formally, the resource
constraints for consumption goods are
1 +( 1− )∗∗
1 +  ()=( 1 − )2 + ∗
2 (25)
(1 − )1 +( 1− )(1− ∗)∗
1 +( 1− ) ()=( 1 − )3 + ∗
3 + (26)
3 +( 1− )∗
3
Equations (25) and (26) are the constraints for the consumption goods for the middle-aged lenders
and the old-aged lenders and borrowers, respectively, where  and ∗ are the fraction of short-
term and long-term producer’s labor devoted to the production of goods consumed by middle-aged
lenders. The resource constraint for capital good remains unchanged.
18It is easy to verify that with  = ∗ =0 , the solution to the planner’s problem in section (4)
also solves the planner’s problem here.11 The intuition is simple. Because lenders view middle-
age consumption and old-age consumption as perfect substitutes and borrowers only value old-age
consumption, the planner can simply allocate all resources to long-term production and agents
consume when old. By doing this, the planner takes full advantage of the higher-return technology
to maximize total output and consumption.
In the decentralized economy, the prices of consumption goods need to be indexed by gener-
ations. Young borrowers have the choice to produce for middle-aged or old agents, and they will
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The prices appear in lender’s budget constraints (i.e., equations (1)and(2)) and old borrower’s bud-
get constraints (i.e., equations (7) and (11)) are indexed by their own generation. In each period,
two consumption good markets open at the same time. At time , the market clearing conditions
for goods consumed by generations born in  − 1 and  − 2, respectively, are
 +( 1− )∗
∗
 + −1 (−1)=( 1 − ˜ −1)2 +˜ −1∗
2
 (1 − ) +( 1− )(1− ∗
)∗





= −23 +( 1− −2)∗
3 +
(1 − ˜ −2)3 +˜ −2∗
3
Again, we focus on stationary equilibrium. In particular, we focus on the equilibrium in which
consumption goods, regardless of their generation types, have the same prices in all periods. It
can be showed that the three cases in section (3) hold here. It follows that the central bank buys
p r i v a t eI O U sa tf a c ev a l u e ,t h u sa c h i e v i n gt h ep l a nner’s allocation in the decentralized economy.
The introduction of generation-speciﬁc goods does not change any of the results obtained in the
model economy with a single consumption good. However, as we will see in the next section, we
modify preferences and the results are diﬀerent.
11Note that the planner’s allocation is not unique —  and 
∗ can be positive as lender’s middle-age and old-age
consumption are perfect substitutes and allocating young borrower’s labor to producing two diﬀerent goods does not
cause extra social costs. Without loss of generality, we can assume  = 
∗ =0here.
197 A Fisherian lender
In this section, we keep our assumption of generation-speciﬁc goods, and we modify the early-
settling lender’s preference. The late-settling lender’s utility function remains as before. Let the
utility function of the early-settling lenders be (2+1).12 Hence, the early-settling lenders have to
settle when middle-aged because they do not value consumption received when old at all. In this
environment, short-term goods and long-term goods are no longer perfect substitutes for the early-
settling lenders. And because goods are generation-speciﬁc, the early-settling lender’s consumption
cannot be provided by the long-term production that started two-periods before. Therefore, the
preference shocks may impose a cost as some resources need to be allocated in the lower-return
technology.
7.1 Planner’s allocation
The planner now maximizes the weighted average utility with the modiﬁed utility function of the
early-settling lenders, subject to the resource constraints (18) − (19) and (25) − (26) with 3 =0 .
With the change in preference, the planner’s solution now has three cases. In all cases, borrowers
are treated equally. Without loss of generality, we assume ∗
2 =0 .
Planner Allocation I: ˆ  =0 , ˆ ∗  1. All capital is allocated in long-term technology. Early-
settling lenders consume labor-produced goods. The labor-produced output is suﬃcient enough to
satisfy the consumption of the early-settling lenders in the sense that full risk sharing is achieved.
Equations (21) − (24) hold here with ˆ 3 =0 . The consumption allocation is the same as in the
baseline model.
Planner Allocation II: ˆ  =0 , ˆ ∗ =1 . All capital is allocated in long-term technology. The
planner rations the output of the young borrowers among the early-settling lenders. Early-settling
lenders consume strictly less than the late-settling lenders. That is, ˆ 2  ˆ ∗
3. The planner’s solution











´  1. This case occurs when the marginal social cost of having 1 extra unit of
capital placed in the lower-return technology is higher than the marginal social beneﬁto fh a v i n g
early-settling lenders consume  (1) extra units of the generation-speciﬁc consumption goods.
12This preference shock is the same as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
20Planner Allocation III: ˆ 0, ˆ ∗ =ˆ  =1 . The planner allocates capital in short-term and
long-term production. This case occurs when the marginal social cost equates the marginal social






= 0 (ˆ ∗
3),
equations (23) and (24) with ˆ 3 =0 , and the resource constraints. Again, ˆ 2  ˆ ∗
3 holds in this
case.
7.2 Repurchase agreement and transfer policies
The equilibrium in the decentralized economy remains the same given the modiﬁcation of the
lender’s preference. However, by changing the lender’s preferences, we derive very diﬀerent results
in terms of the equilibrium eﬃciency and its implication for the monetary policy. The results are
presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Equilibrium case 1 implements Planner Allocation I. With a proper lump-sum tax
scheme, equilibrium cases 2 and 3 implement Planner Allocation II and III, respectively.
Proof. See appendix.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition is the same as in Proposition 2. With ample liquidity, all
capital is devoted to long-term production and full risk sharing is achieved between two diﬀerent
types of lenders in equilibrium.
The second part of the proposition says that with the change in preference, the equilibrium
in case 2 and case 3 is eﬃcient even without the unconventional monetary repurchase agreement.
In both cases, the discount price is less than 1. This price reﬂects the fact that the middle-age
consumption is more costly because the resource for middle-age consumption is more scarce (in case
2 the consumption comes from young borrower’s production only) and it requires some resources
invested in a lower-return technology (as in case 3). The lump-sum tax scheme is needed to achieve
the desired level of risk sharing among lenders. It does not drive wedges between the prices and
the marginal rate of substitutions of the borrowers.
The changes in results and policy implications in our modiﬁed model tells us how important the
identiﬁcation of the friction is. The market price reﬂects lender’s marginal cost of consuming when
21middle-aged versus when old. However, the market does not distinguish the driving force of this
cost—whether it is due to a purely timing friction imposed by the market participation restriction
or due to a preference shock. When it is due to a timing friction, the discount price is the liquidity
premium of money. So injecting liquidity can solve the problem and the unconventional repurchase
agreements are optimal. When it is due to a preference shock, the discount price reﬂects the
fundamental cost of middle-age consumption. Monetary intervention is not necessary and it can
even harm the economy as it distorts the producer’s marginal rate of substitution. With a slight
modiﬁcation to preferences, the identiﬁcation is more challenging. Simply put, the price of IOUs is
not suﬃcient to indicate a liquidity problem that exists concomitantly with an ineﬃcient equilibria.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We build a model to capture many features associated with ﬁnancial crises. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, leveraging plays a key role in the set of conditions necessary for a liquidity crisis to occur.
Indeed, we show that the equilibrium in our baseline model is ineﬃcient only if the borrower has
leveraged their capital purchases such that the value of the debts exceeds the value of ﬁat money
holdings. We also focus on events in secondary asset markets and debt settlements.13 Our central
question is, what is the optimal policy response to the liquidity crisis? In our setup, the liquid-
ity problem is not a shortage of aggregate liquidity, it is the distribution of liquidity that drives
the ineﬃciency. An unconventional repurchase agreement implements the eﬃcient allocation by
redistributing liquidity across diﬀerent markets.
We demonstrate that unconventional monetary policy depends on the types of underlying fric-
tions that drive the price in the secondary market away from the par. The underlying frictions are
not perfectly identiﬁable by discounts in secondary markets. In the baseline model, the idiosyncratic
shock is modelled as a timing mismatch in debt settlements that owes to a settlement participation
risk. The monetary policy is eﬀective because it eliminates the timing friction by substituting the
central bank for the lenders temporarily in debt settlements. However, if the timing mismatch is
driven by preference shocks as in Diamond-Dyvbig (1983), the apparent ﬁre sale price embodies the
higher cost of consuming early. The unconventional monetary policy is not able to address such a
13Gorton (2007) submits that activity in secondary markets were important in the emergence of the most recent
liquidity crisis that started in 2007.
22real shock. Hence, the application of unconventional monetary policy requires careful examination
of the nature of the shock.
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24Appendix
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 :We prove the lemma by checking the lender’s budget constraints.
Prove by contradiction. First consider   1. Suppose that +1 (1 + )  1. The lender’s
budget sets expand as  shrinks. This is true for both early-settling and late-settling lenders. The
young lender prefers to lend only to the long-term producers since the product of the discounted
price and the long-term loan markup exceeds the face value of the loan. With such an arbitrage
opportunity, lenders will lower the interest rate to  − 1,w h e r e1 → 0 and raise the interest
rate on short-term loan to 1+2,w h e r e2 → 0. This continues until the arbitrage opportunity
vanishes. The upshot is that 1+  1+1 cannot be the equilibrium interest rate on long-term
production loan.
Alternatively, suppose that +1 (1 + )  1. In this case, both early-settling and late-settling
lenders see their budget sets expand as  increases. In this case, a lender prefers to raise the
long-term interest rate, thus excluding long-term producers. It follows that 1+  1+1 cannot
be the equilibrium interest rate on long-term production loan.
Lastly, consider  =1 . All IOUs are settled in the short term. The discount price is 1 because
the IOUs will be settled at face value when the date− generation is middle-aged.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 :F i r s t ,p r o v e   1 by contradiction. Consider an equilibrium with
 =1 . It follows that borrowers choose only short-term production if and only if lifetime utility
is higher when calculated under short-term production than under long-term production. With
no long-term producers, all IOUs are settled, rendering the secondary market moot and +1 =1 .
So, we need to show that at least one borrower would realize higher lifetime utility by choosing
long-term production.
When satisﬁed, equations (9) and (13) imply that 0 ()=0 (∗
)=+1. The strictly
concavity of the production function implies that   ∗
 for this case. After rearranging, the
short-term producer’s lifetime budget constraint is written as

















25It is suﬃcient, therefore to compare ()−0 () and [(∗
) − 0 (∗
)∗
] to determine which
producer type has the larger budget set. After rearranging, [(∗
) − 0 (∗
)∗
]−[() − 0 ()]=
(∗
) − () − 0 (∗
)(∗
 − ).W i t h  () strictly concave, it follows that
(∗
) − 0 (∗
)(∗
 − )  ()
Next, subtract  () from both sides, yielding (∗
)−()−0 (∗
)(∗
 − )  ()− ()
where  ()− ()  0 for 1. Thus, the long-term producer’s budget set is bigger, implying
that the long-term producers’ lifetime utility is strictly greater than the short-term producer’s
lifetime utility. A contradiction.
If 1 −   0, then short-term production and long-term production coexist. It follows that
lifetime welfare must be the same for the two types. As their marginal rates of intertemporal
substitution are equal, their life-time budget constraints are the same. As such, we can write,
() − 0 () = +1
£
(∗














Because  ()0 () −  is monotone by concavity of  (·),w eh a v e = ∗
. Further, the capital
market-clearing condition guarantees that  = ∗
 = .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 The equilibrium with tax scheme can be characterized by the following
equations. On the borrower’s side, the budget constraints and the ﬁrst-order conditions (combined





1 − ∗1 − 0 ()
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where ∗1 and ∗3 are the taxes that the borrowers pay when young and old, respectively.
Note that short-term producers, if there is any, will be taxed of the same amount as the long-term
producers to achieve the social optimum.
The lenders are taxed so that their consumption is
2 = 
£




3 = 0 () − ∗ (32)
26where 2 is the transfer to the middle-aged lenders and 3 is the tax when they are old. Fur-
thermore, let 2 ≤ 0 and 3 ≥ 0. That is, we tax early-settling lenders when they are old but
not when they are middle-aged so no there is no production in the short-term production will be
wasted.
The secondary market clearing condition is
∗
1 − ∗1 +  () ≥ (1 − )
£
0 () − 3
¤
(33)
The balanced budget constraint is
∗1 + ∗3 +( 1− )(2 + 3)+∗ =0 (34)
The feasibility constraint for early-settling lenders tax/transfer is





3 ˆ 2 ˆ ∗
3
´
in Planner Allocation II, the lump-sum tax scheme can be set as fol-
lows. Tax short-term producers suﬃciently high so there is no short-term producers in equilibrium
































´3 = ˆ ∗








∗1 +( 1− )2 =0
and equation (34). Note that the number of unknowns (∗1 ∗3 2 3 ∗) exceeds the
number of equations, so the conditions that 2 ≤ 0 and 3 ≥ 0 can always be satisﬁed. Given
the tax scheme, the solution to (∗
1 ∗
3 2∗
3) are solved by (29) − (33) with (33) holds with






3 ˆ 2 ˆ ∗
3
´
in Planner Allocation III, the lump-sum tax scheme can be set as
follows. Tax short-term producers the same amount as long-term producers when young and old.
That is, 1 = ∗1 and 3 = ∗3 The short-term producer’s life-time budget constraint is
()+1 − 1 − 0 ()

− 3 = 3 (36)
27With the same tax obligation, short-term producers and long-term producers have the same budget





∗3 =  ()+ˆ ∗





∗1 − (1 − )
1

3 = ˆ ∗
1 + ˆ  () − (1 − )0 ()
∗1 +( 1− )2 =0
and equation (34). Again, the number of unknowns exceeds the number of equations and the




3) are solved by (29)−(33) with (33) holds with equality and  =1 . By convexity
of the problem, the solution is unique and the same as the planner’s allocation.
28